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The theory of fiscal federalism points out that decentralisation should be pursued in order to 
fit differences in individual preferences. However, the presence of externalities and the need 
of providing merit goods to citizens suggest that centralisation is likely  to produce more 
efficient results. Moreover, in a political economy framework, each decision - including the 
possibility to fix a standard level of services - mainly depends on the objective function of the 
policymakers. Adopting this approach, the aim of this paper is to compare the individual 
convenience of a common standard level defined under a centralised system versus different 
provisions of public services when decisions are decentralised. Income heterogeneity across 
individuals is assumed. 
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In general, the reason for providing a common standard level of services in all regions within 
the same country lies basically in equity motivations or in the fact that supplying such levels 
allows  fulfilling  some  basic  individual  rights  and  common  needs.  Merit  goods  (Musgrave 
1957,  1987)1  are  an  example  where  the  State  imposes  compulsory  consumption  of  certain 
services (such as in health care or primary education) generating interference problems with 
individuals’ preferences due to a paternalistic attitude of the State. As it is known, one of the 
possible interpretations of this concept focuses on two main characteristics: the presence of 
external effects and a distorted set of individual preferences that might lead to either under or 
overconsumption (Liberati 2003). The introduction of the latter principle may undermine the 
fundamentals of the welfare theory, considering the State as a separate entity from the citizens, 
with its own purposes and needs which do not necessarily coincide with the will and tastes of 
individuals.  
However, interferences with individual preferences appear to be a common trend in social 
life. Moreover, it should be said that some kind of interference occurs not only when we 
discuss public action and assistance, but it is also quite widespread in market relations (e.g., the 
role  of  advertising  in “forcing”  consumers’  preferences).  Hence,  to  justify the  provision  of 
goods satisfying needs not “included” in the traditional distinction between private and public 
goods  and  characterised  by  some  “intrusion”  of  the  State  in  individuals’  preferences, 
philosophers, scholars and economists have tried to give some normative interpretations and 
theoretical responses.  
Actually, the concept of “merit good” has been extensively revised in the literature that 
extended  its  traditional  boundaries  -  such  as  externalities,  paternalism  and  redistribution 
issues - and emphasised its role as a tool of the so-called “positive freedom” (see Chiancone and 
Osculati 1993). Following this approach, it seems to emerge that such goods are provided in 
order to guarantee - and not to impose preferences - some minimum rights (such as to health 
care, to education) that each individual should have to freely pursue his/her life projects (i.e., 
“enabling goods” or “functioning goods”; see also Bariletti 1993; Forte 1993; Granaglia 1993). 
According to Rawls (1971), for example, a standard level of primary goods should be provided 
to all citizens in relation to a justice-equity principle which basically implies a certain degree of 
equality  of  resources.  Likewise,  Sen  (1980,  1987a,  1987b,  1992)  also  affirms  that  some 
commodities  should  be  assigned  according  to  a  more  general  concept  of  equality  of 
opportunity.2  
From this viewpoint, public services such as social or health services should be provided to 
citizens  at  a  certain  common  level.  In  this  framework,  the  usual  assumptions  concerning 
heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences seem to be not appropriate because of philosophical 
and equity reasons, and simply because the cultural context, which contributes to define the 
concept of equity and the rights of people, can be considered quite homogeneous within a 
nation,  also  implying  homogenous preferences  for  goods  and  services  that can  fulfil these 
individual  rights.  Following  this  approach,  the  idea  of  the  standard  level  of  services 
differentiated across regions seems to be a sort of contradiction. However, the fact that regions 
can have (and collect) different (revenue) resources may imply a different provision of this kind 
of goods and services. 
Generally  speaking,  the  key  issue  remains  how  fiscal  federalism  can  interact  with  the 
provision of public goods aimed at fulfilling individual rights when opinions and preferences 
for such goods are shared between local and central governments, and also among individuals. 
Local governments seem therefore an unnecessary structure, from a normative point of view, 
as it may well be conceived a central government directly providing uniform level of services. 
In this vein, intersection with federalism appears to occur at the lowest level: regions may act 
only as agents of the central government.  
                                                 
1 On this concept, see also Head (1966, 1969), McLure (1968) and Pulsipher (1971). 
2 For further details on the analysis of the equality principle according to Sen, see Granaglia (2007).    3 
Yet, within a context of homogenous cultural values it is likely that central and local 
governments  share  this  “merit  good”  argument  -  so  no  preference-revelation  mechanism 
should be involved - and the idea on the appropriate levels of such services. In this case, 
regions can be also responsible for this kind of spending and set the efficient level, given 
different local resources. Indeed, it would be perfectly conceivable that regions will finance 
such services with their own resources. Thus, even though combining goods and services 
aimed at fulfilling individual rights with the theory of fiscal federalism is likely to be a hard 
task - and not yet much explored in the literature3 - it seems more feasible when opinions and 
preferences for these goods are shared within the national territory.  
Actually, this does not necessarily imply a uniform provision across regions as the amount 
of local resources and tax bases may be different, especially when income heterogeneity across 
individuals occurs. Hence, we try to revise, to some extent, the traditional trade-off between 
equity and efficiency concerning the opportunity/convenience of differentiating the provision 
of such public goods. In this framework, the degree of income inequality between and within 
jurisdictions can affect local governments’ decision-making process, including the opportunity 
to fix (or not) a standard level of such services.  
The aim of this paper is to suggest some possible explanations, on theoretical grounds, 
about the tendency of differentiating the level of such services within a political economy 
framework and investigate under which conditions it is convenient for individuals having or 
not  such  differentiated  standards.  In  this  framework,  each  decision  is  assumed  to  mainly 
depend on the objective function of the policy-makers and on the voting mechanism designed 
to select them. Hence, the politicians’ election is also an important step for the story of the 
model. 
Previous works have emphasised that the case for decentralisation has to be driven by 
political economy considerations. Seabright (1996), Lockwood (2002), Besley and Coate (2003) 
present models in which potential benefits of decentralisation are derived through endogenous 
choices under alternative political aggregation mechanisms. Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998) 
analyse alternative methods of delegating authority; in their model, a central government has 
limited ability to monitor the performance of the bureaucrats while in a decentralised system 
the  local  governments  may  be  subject  to  capture  by  local  elites.  Besharov  (2002)  studies 
different regimes for the provision of local public goods in a “menu auction” common agency 
setting. In his model, the advantage of the decentralised regime is that it reduces influence 
costs. 
In our case, policy is not negotiated by regional representatives as under decentralisation 
they decide independently; whereas under centralisation they are always assumed to cooperate 
(i.e., cooperative legislature as in Besley and Coate 2003). In this vein, our approach is similar 
to  the  most  common  utilitarianism  approach  which  involves  no  conflict  between  different 
political groups or classes as argued by Sen (1973): “maximizing the sum of individual utilities 
is supremely unconcerned with the interpersonal distribution of that sum”. The important 
feature  of  the  model  is  that  decisions  regarding  taxation  and  public  goods  are  made 
simultaneously to solve the same maximisation problem of the elected policy-makers. These 
are the cases of “simultaneous centralisation” and “simultaneous decentralisation”, as argued 
by Lundholm (2008). 
Given  this  setting,  we  compare  decentralised  versus  centralised  solution4  from  an 
individual utility viewpoint. Indeed, each individual votes on centralisation or decentralisation 
of public goods provision and taxation, which implies a different policy mix in both cases. In 
detail, a common standard level will be defined under a centralised system, while different 
provisions of public goods and services are allowed when decisions are decentralised. The 
voting  result  for  the  institutional  system  mainly  depends  on  how  income  varies  across 
                                                 
3 Some exceptions are included in Liberati (2003), where some theoretical aspects of the relationship 
between fiscal federalism and national health standards in Italy (LEAs) are extensively discussed. 
4 A variety of approaches has modelled the trade-off between decentralisation and other forms of more 
centralised policymaking within the national territory (e.g., Lockwood 2002; Besley and Coate 2003; 
Brueckner 2004; Goyal and Staal 2004; Janeba and Wilson 2010) and also during the breaking up of 
nations process (e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997; Bolton and Roland 1997; Spolaore 2008).   4 
individuals  within  the  same  jurisdiction  and  between  different  regions.  Indeed,  income 
heterogeneity  across  individuals  is  assumed  and  this  represents  the  only  dimension  of 
heterogeneity; in turn, the utility function is the same for individuals and preferences for such 
public services - aimed at fulfilling individual rights - can be considered homogenous (see also 
Hatfield and Miquel 2008).  
Preferences heterogeneity is, to some extent, a sufficient (Oates 1972) but not a necessary 
condition (Seabright 1996; Besley and Coate 2003; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 2007) to 
make a case for decentralisation, as other kinds of heterogeneity can be considered. Bolton and 
Roland (1997), for example, focus on redistribution conflicts and on differences in income 
distribution across regions as the source of breakup of nations, finding that when income 
distribution varies across regions, separation is likely to occur in equilibrium. More recently, 
Giuranno (2009), by analysing the relation between regional income disparity and the size of 
the public sector in a two-jurisdiction polity, shows that higher income disparities among 
regions  (arising  in  some  cases  from  the  growing  divergence  between  richer  and  poorer 
regions)  intensify  interregional  redistributive  conflicts,  potentially  leading  to  an  under-
provision of public goods. 
To some extent, we also highlight the impact of interregional redistributive conflicts on 
public spending, stressing the importance of income disparities on the public policy decision-
making process. However, a main difference between this paper and the Giuranno’s model is 
that we do not always assume uniform public goods provision across regions, allowing for no 
policy  uniformity  at  least  under  decentralisation.  Moreover,  we  take  into  account  both 
intraregional and interregional inequality, while only the latter effect is studied in his paper.  
From  a  positive  viewpoint,  our  main  findings  are  that  it  is  more  likely  to  vote  for 
decentralisation  without  a  common  standard  of  public  services  when:  regional  per  capita 
income is higher than the average (according to a “tax base factor” also found by Bolton and 
Roland 1997); income inequality between regions is high. The last result appears to be in line 
with some empirically observed institutional conflicts across regions about different level of 
redistribution (notable examples are in Italy, Spain and Belgium). On the contrary, the impact 
of within income inequality is more ambiguous as it has an opposite effect on taxation and 
public spending, affecting the choice of the institutional system in a different way. Finally, rich 
and poor people find a different convenience of voting for a common standard level of public 
services provided under a centralised system, revealing to some extent different attitudes and 
“preferences” for redistribution. Yet, this result does not hold for each value of within income 
inequality. Indeed, we find that rich and poor individuals are willing to vote for the same 
institutional setting when income distribution worsens within their region. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  outlines  the  general 
theoretical framework of the model. Section 3 and 4 describe decentralised and centralised 
case, respectively. Results and their discussion are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 




2. The general model 
 
 
In  this  section,  we  describe  the  general  features  of  the  model,  which  hold  under  both 
institutional  settings  (centralisation  and  decentralisation)  in  order  to  compare  a  common 
standard level of services, which emerges under a centralised system, with different provisions 
of public goods and services when decisions are decentralised. In the first case, public policy is 
defined  by  a  cooperative legislature  (as  in Besley  and  Coate  2003)  where  all  local  policy-
makers cooperate in order to maximise their joint utility functions; in the second case, public 
policies are chosen independently by the elected representatives in each region. In a political 
economy framework, each decision - including the possibility to fix a standard level of services 
- mainly depends on the objective function of the policy-makers and on the voting mechanism 
designed to select them. Hence, the choice of providing, for example, different or equal amount   5 
of public goods across regions reflects the convenience of the decision-makers, which can be 
also different under either regime. 
In detail, we present a model of public finance similar to those of Persson and Tabellini 
(2000)  and  Giuranno  (2009),  where  the  policy  to  be  determined  concerns  the  level  of 
government spending, which benefits all voters alike. A polity with N individuals divided into 
J different districts, each with its own local government and different population size ( j n ), is 
considered. Income is the only dimension of heterogeneity across citizens, while preferences 
for public goods are assumed to be homogenous ( 1 0 < < β ) within the national territory. 
Instead  of  considering  citizens’  preferences  as  a  source  of  heterogeneity,  we  focus  on  a 
different element in order to explain the voting result for the institutional setting.5 
As  in  some  previous  studies  (Seabright  1996;  Besley  and  Coate  2003;  Tommasi  and 
Weinschelbaum 2007), we do not necessarily require heterogeneity a la Oates (1972) to make a 
case  for  decentralisation.  Indeed,  many  public  goods  -  similar  to  “merit  goods”  -  lack 
substantial taste heterogeneity (see also Hatfield and Miquel 2008). This can basically due to 
the fact that differences in preferences for such provision are usually weak as this kind of 
services are aimed at fulfilling individual rights that are considered valuable to protection by 
everybody, especially within a homogenous cultural context (Rawls 1971; Sen 19806). 
Following  this  reasoning,  we  assume  that  each  citizen  i   has  the  same  quasi-linear 
preferences over private consumption (
i
j c ) and public goods ( j G ) provided by his/her region 
j, which is given by: 
 
 




j G c U ln β + =                                                              (1) 
 
 
We consider a quasi-linear utility function to ensure that there are no income effects in the 
enjoyment of such public goods. Hence, government spending is provided equally to everyone 
within the same jurisdiction, so that  0 > j G .7 Actually, different public good provisions can be 
implemented across regions according to heterogeneous income distributions and available 
local resources. Indeed, richer regions could, for example, provide a higher level of public 
goods imposing a lower tax rate (Boadway and Hobson 1993). 
Any tension in deciding the provision level will thus come from the use of taxes that 
differently affect citizens. Indeed, each local government finances public goods by levying a 
proportional  income  tax  rate  ( 1 0 < < j t ),  which  will  be differently  defined  under  the two 
institutional  systems.  Hence,  individual’s  private  consumption  is  equal  to  private  income 
( 0 >
i








j y t c − = 1                                                                 (2) 
 
 
                                                 
5 As we have demonstrated in a previous paper (see Fiorillo and Sacchi 2011), a different source of 
disparity among regions - such as their population size in that case - allows challenging the traditional 
findings according to which higher heterogeneity should basically enhance more decentralisation. 
6 Our hypothesis is more consistent with the functioning issue rather than the capabilities one.  
7 The choice between centralised and decentralised provision does not compromise the existence of this 
minimum value in both cases. Indeed, individual comparisons are involved on amounts beyond this 
threshold which is always guaranteed.   6 
As a matter of fact, allowing each community to design and implement its own distinctive 
blend of policies also implies a system of differentiated taxes that would depend on regional 
income. Such differentiated tax rates are determined and imposed separately by each local 
authority under decentralisation and jointly by all regions under centralisation. The latter 
represents  a  case  of  regional  cooperation  where  politicians  of  all  districts  are  assumed  to 
cooperate and choose not to differentiate inhabitants in terms of taxation, setting a unique tax 
rate  ( t t j = )  to  finance  the  sum  of  public  good  provisions  in  all  jurisdictions.  Thus,  the 
equilibrium tax rate under centralisation will not coincide, in general, with the tax rate chosen 
by  the  elected  candidate  in  each  region.  Broadly  speaking,  cooperation  imposes  some 
institutional constraints similar to those existing within a unified nation, where regions do not 
have total freedom in their choice of tax policies (see, for example, Bolton and Roland 1997). 
Local  administrations  use  their  revenues  to  provide  local  public  goods  to  citizens 
belonging to their jurisdiction. The government budget constraint is then simply the sum of 
income revenues collected within region that are also assumed to be equal to the total cost of 
providing public goods and services. In both cases, public policy is an “active” government 
intervention that has a cost. We assume, for simplicity, that the unit cost of the public good is 
the same across regions under both scenarios (see also Oates 1972)8 and that it takes into 
account the government spending in all regions, like the average cost relating to the total 
public provision in the economy:  
 
 















                                                      (3) 
 
 
where γ  - satisfying the condition  1 0 < <γ  - captures the presence of positive externalities 
related  to  the  production  cost  of  public  policies  across  local  jurisdictions  (externality 
production). For instance, the cost of providing social services (i.e., hospitals) decreases when 
other regions provide a good level of these services as congestion problems, for example, 
should not arise in this case.  In other words, regions can pay less to finance this kind of goods 
if others - especially neighbouring - supply similar services. The parameter γ  is a measure of 
the  average  spillovers  effect  deriving  from  the  mix  of  public  goods  provided  by  local 
governments. It allows the reduction in production costs of government spending as each local 
policy-maker can exploit these beneficial effects by paying less for providing public goods to 














, lower is the production cost. In other words, γ  can be interpreted like 
both externality and scale indexes.    
The  timing  of  the  model  is  as  follows.  Each  individual  votes  on  centralisation  or 
decentralisation; the final outcome emerges according to the simply majority rule.9 In the 
second stage, a politician is chosen within each region. This is modelled as a citizen-candidate 
game (Besley and Coate 1997), where citizens stand for election by committing to platforms 
that they prefer themselves ex post. Candidates are evaluated comparing their proposals on tax 
and spending policies; then, the policy-maker is elected on the income basis as income is the 
                                                 
8 If it is not the case - for example, if under centralisation important economies of scale in the provision 
of the good, that are not available to local governments individually under decentralisation, can be 
realised - centralisation may be desirable for cost-savings reasons. 
9 Note that our analysis only shows which institutional setting citizens would prefer given exogenous 
conditions, but the actual prevailing system will depend on how individual votes are weighted and 
aggregated at the national level.   7 
only  difference  across  individuals  and  can  determine  a  different  policy  mix  to  implement. 
Finally, the elected candidates set both the level of public spending and the corresponding tax 
rate to finance it. 
The important feature of the model is that decisions regarding taxation and public services 
production are made simultaneously to solve the maximisation problem of the elected policy-
makers.  This  case  could  be  similar  to  the  concepts  of  “simultaneous  centralisation”  and 
“simultaneous  decentralisation”  developed  by  (Lundholm  2008).  The  former  reflects  the 
standard assumption in the literature according to which public decision making is centralised 
and  coordinated  in  the  sense  that  decisions  about  the  structures  of  taxation  and  public 
expenditure are made simultaneously by the central government. However, centralisation can 
be also when both the decisions, about which projects to fund and which tax setting to finance 
them, are made by a legislature that comprised of delegates from all regions, as defined by 
Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003).10 We follow this approach in analysing the 
centralised  case.  In  turn,  “simultaneous  decentralisation”  is  opposite  to  that of  “sequential 
decentralisation”  of  public  goods  production  decisions,  where  public  goods  production  is 
delegated to a subordinate bureau, whereas decisions about taxation are taken by the central 
government (Lundholm 2008).  
In next sections, we describe the choices of public spending and taxation level under a 
decentralised system and a centralised one in a separate way. As in Lockwood (2002), the 
difference between decentralisation and centralisation concerns the financing mechanism: in 
the former, public goods provision is funded by a proportional regional tax with different tax 
rates ( j t ); in the latter, decisions about uniform tax rate setting (t) on all citizens are made by 
a  single  legislature  representing  the  cooperation  among  politicians  of  all  regions.  Indeed, 
under  centralisation  we  assume  a  cooperative  solution  among  local  decision-makers  as  in 
Besley and Coate (2003), without considering the non-cooperative case.11  
Hence, they agree to the public goods allocation that maximises their joint welfare (see 
also Weingast 1979; Fitts and Inman 1990). According to the central tenet of the Public Choice 
approach,  decision-makers  are  assumed  to  be  utility-maximisers  with  their  own  objective 
functions in both cases. Thus, the general approach we adopt is to find the taxation level and 
public  spending  which  maximise  the  elected  representative‘s  welfare  subject  to  the 
government budget constrain. 
This political decision-making process can be solved for backward induction. Thus, we first 
derive the level of public goods and services and taxation set by the elected politician; then, we 
turn to the voting stage, solving the citizens’ selection problem of representatives and finally, 
we compare decentralised versus centralised solution from the individual utility viewpoint. The 










                                                 
10 Actually, in this framework there can be also two alternative types of “partial centralisation”: the first 
is “centralised expenditure“, where projects are decided upon by central government, but are funded by 
regions; the second “centralised funding”, where projects and policies are decided upon regionally, but 
funded through a national tax (Lockwood 1998). 
11  Coasian  logic  (i.e.,  Wittman  1989)  suggests  that  legislators  should  find  their  way  around  the 
inefficiency  created  by  majoritarian  decision  criteria  under  the  minimum  winning  coalition,  usually 
associated with the non-cooperative legislative behaviour. This theoretical observation, coupled with the 
empirical evidence where - at least in the United States - minimum winning coalitions for this type of 
spending seem the exception rather than rule, has led many scholars to abandon this view of legislative 
behaviour in favour of more cooperative approaches.   8 
3. The decentralised case  
 
 
3.1. The choice of public spending and taxation 
 
Under decentralisation, policies are chosen simultaneously by the elected representative in 
each  district.12  Representatives  are  characterised  by  their  utility  function  (
d
j U )  and  their 
income ( j d ). As described above, the only issue of heterogeneity across individuals is income.   
When each local government controls its own taxes as well as the expenditure levels for 
its residents, the government budget constraint is then simply: 
 
 








                                                          (4) 
 
 
where the left-hand side of equation (4) represents the sum of all income taxes collected within 
the local jurisdiction; this sum is assumed to be equal to the total cost of public goods supply.13 
We can now write the maximisation problem of the policy-maker as follows: 
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β + − =       s.t. (3) and (4)                                      (5) 
 
 
Solving expression (5) yields: 
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j j                                                                        (7) 
  
                                                 
12 The assumption according to which a single representative makes decisions also in a decentralised 
system is a simplification trying to capture the reality that there will be a greater commonality of 
interest across sub-districts than across district, even if in the real decentralised institutional setting 
decisions are typically made by legislatures consisting of elected representatives of each of the sub-
districts of the district. 
13  Under  decentralisation,  intergovernmental  transfers  (of  both  vertical  and  horizontal  types)  are 
excluded from the model as we assume that local taxes, levied to finance public services, are allocated on 
a sort of benefit base. In this case, no central or interregional equalisation should be needed (Musgrave 
1961). On the other hand, indirect or direct forms of compensation schemes are better allowed under 
centralisation. Moreover, we assume for simplicity neither tax evasion nor deadweight losses usually 
involved by (income) taxation (see, for example, Bolton and Roland 1997). As noted before (see footnote 
7), each local government is able to provide at least the minimum level of 







j j y Y
1
 is total regional income. Both public goods and taxation levels negatively 
depend on the representative’s income because of the marginal utility of public services with 
respect to the marginal utility of income. Moreover, they both increase with the scale effect as 
it allows the reduction costs of public services, enhancing a sort of substitution effect. 
 
3.2. The election of the policy-maker 
 
According  to  the  citizen-candidate  approach, voters  elect  candidates  whose policy  satisfies 
their  utility  functions.  As  individuals  differ  only  for  personal  income,  the  policy-maker 
selection is based on this variable. The maximisation problem of the generic individual is: 
 
 





j d G y d t U
j
ln 1 max β + − =       s.t. (6) and (7)                               (8) 
 
 
Solving expression (8) and according to the median-voter theorem,14 it follows: 
 
 












































, then  j j m d ≤ . This means 
that income of the elected policy-maker is not higher than that of the median-voter.15 Hence, 
citizens choose a politician who is poorer than the median-voter because a higher level of 
public good would be provided by this way; this also allows exploiting economies of scale 
( ) J / γ . Thus, a “delegation effect” - producing “excessive levels” of public spending16 - also 





                                                 
14 Indeed, individual preferences are one-dimensional and single-peaked, thus the theorem holds. 
15  Only  with  no  externalities  ( 0 → γ )  or  considering  a  polity  with  only  one  region  ( 1 = J ),  the 
representative is the median-voter.  
16 More generally, these concepts sound quite familiar to the Public Choice approach according to which 
an “excess bias” in demanding public spending may occur when the median-voter’s choice prevails with 
a majority rule. 
17 The strategic incentive to elect representatives with strong preferences for local public spending also 
arises in the analysis of Chari et al. (1997).   10 
4. The centralised case 
 
 
4.1. The choice of public spending and taxation 
 
Policy determination under centralisation also has an election and a policy selection stage. We 
here analyse the second step, whereas the election process will be described in the next section. 
Under  centralisation,  the  legislature  determines  public  spending  and  the  tax  rate  in  each 
district. As in Besley and Coate (2003), a key issue is how to approach decision making in the 
legislature. In detail, we assume J collaborative local policy-makers - holding homogenous 
preferences for public goods and services - who cooperate in order to share the maximum level 
of their joint utilities. Even though there are gains from cooperation, this does not imply an 
obvious alternative for predicting legislative choices; there are indeed many pairs of public 
spending levels that are efficient from the viewpoint of the representatives.  
By  applying  a  uniform  tax  rate  across  regions  (t),  the  total  cost  of  providing  public 
expenditure within the country is covered as follows:   
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α                                                         (10) 
 
 
The  adoption  of  geographically  discriminating  income  tax  rates  by  cooperative  decision-
makers would be typically prevented by constitutional or other political obstacles, even though 
it could enhance a sort of horizontal equity (Oates 1972). Actually, this mechanism can better 
work in a “real” federal system where an active role of the central government is allowed. In 
our case, cooperation means to share the financing cost of public services provision within the 
national territory whereby some implicit transfers across regions may occur. 
Likewise the decentralisation case, the maximisation problem of politicians who cooperate 
is given by the following: 
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Public spending and tax solutions are: 
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 represents total national income. First, it is easy to note that the level of 
public goods and services provided under a centralised institutional setting is equal across 
regions ( G G G k j = = ). This is due to the fact that within a homogenous cultural context, 
differences in preferences for goods aimed at fulfilling personal rights are usually weak enough 
-  null  in  our  case  -  to  justify  a  different  provision  of  such  goods  in  each  region  under a 
cooperative  legislature.  In  this  case,  regional  representatives  find  more  convenience  in 
assigning the same level of public services across regions instead of differentiating it.18 
Moreover,  the  level  of  G   negatively  depends  on  average  delegates’  personal  income 














,  because  the 
marginal utility of public services is decreasing with respect to the marginal utility of income.  
Likewise,  the  unique  tax  rate  is  also  inversely  related  to  average  policy-makers’  income. 
Finally, also in this case, both taxation and spending levels are positively correlated with the 
externality-scale index. 
 
4.2. The strategic choice of the policy-makers 
 











ln 1 max β + − =       s.t. (12) and (13)                            (14) 
 
 
Note that the main result of cooperation is to fix a standard level of services depending on the 
type of the legislators in all districts. Then, each individual would choose the policy-maker in 
all regions selecting an “average leader” (whose income is  d ) who maximises his/her utility 
function. Yet, each individual can vote only for a local candidate without affecting the voting 
result  of  other  jurisdictions.  This  may  generate  incentives  for  citizens  in  each  region  to 
delegate policy-making strategically (see also Persson and Tabellini 1992; Besley and Coate 
2003)19. Characterising such incentives turns out to be quite complicated. 
The FOC for solving equation (14) can be written as:20 
 
 




















                                               (15) 
 
 
                                                 
18 Note that this result might not hold considering non-cooperative legislature and minimum winning 
coalitions linked thereto. Moreover, in order to keep the model tractable we assume that each local 
representative has the same weight in deciding the policy mix under centralisation. Hence, we consider 
the unweighted sum of the utility function of each local policy-maker in equation (11). 
19 “Strategic delegation: each district’s median voter delegates policy-making to a representative with a 
different preference for public goods” (Besley and Coate 2003, p. 2624). 

















 represents an example of strategic delegation according to which the election in 
one region actually depends on the expectations on elected candidates in other regions. In 























































  is  the  sum  of  the  expected  decision  maker  in  region  k  when 
residents in region j change their voting. Solving (16) implies:  
 
 








j j d Jy d                                                            (17) 
 
 
where  ( )
e
k d  is the decision-maker expected by citizens of region j to be elected in region k. 
Thus, each individual would choose himself as the “average policy-maker”. As the median-
voter theorem holds,21 the election result is: 
 
 






k j j d Jm d                                                            (18) 
 
 
The majority rule in each district could lead to different solutions depending on the expected 
income level of the decision-makers in other regions. Equation (18) means that  d  should be 
equal to  j m ; this condition is not feasible in all jurisdictions at the same time given median-
voters’  income  heterogeneity  (i.e.,  the  median-voter  in  each  region  has  different  preferred 
candidates). Thus, different equilibria are feasible.  
We  can  start  from  a  situation  where  individuals  vote  for  their  local  median-voter 
( j j m d = ). We wonder whether this starting point is an equilibrium or not. It represents the 
equilibrium only if neither strategic vote nor myopic expectation is assumed. The latter means 
that region j expects that all other regions k always vote like region j itself: ( ) j
e
k m d = . Thus, 





.  Yet,  in  this  case  systematic  errors  occur  and  expectations  are  not 
fulfilled. 
On the other hand, if we assume rational expectations and that each region adjusts its 
decision  in  order  to  increase  the  utility  of  its  own  median-voter,  the  equilibrium  is  then 
                                                 










d  that is likely to be true.   13 
different from the starting point. In detail, regions with median-voter’s income lower than 
their mean ( m m j < ) have an incentive to delegate policy-making to a representative poorer 
than its median-voter in order to reduce politicians’ average income. On the contrary, regions 
with median-voter’s income higher than their mean ( m m j > ) have an incentive to delegate 
policy-making to a representative richer than its median-voter in order to increase politicians’ 
average income. Hence, let us order, to simplify the exposition and keep the model tractable, 
that  the  median-voter  of  region  1  is  richer  than  one  of  region  2  and  so  on: 
J m m m > > > ... 2 1 ,22 so it can be demonstrated that  1 m d = .  
Income heterogeneity creates an additional conflict over the level of public spending. If 
each region elects a representative of the median type, the common level of public goods is 
higher  for  rich  regions  and  lower  for  those  which  are  poor.  Hence,  the  former  have  an 
incentive to vote for a candidate richer than the median-voter; for the latter, the opposite 
incentive  prevails.  In  short,  “such  strategic  delegation  can  be  individually  rational,  but 
collectively self-defeating […] as even when regions share an interest in each other’s public 
goods, the conflict of interest over the level of public spending means that centralisation can 
yield policy outcomes that are far from the surplus maximising ideal” (Besley and Coate 2003, 
p. 2626). 
We may generalise these results assuming that average income of politicians corresponds 
to income of the median-voter of a generic region (R), thus  R m = d . Under this condition, we 




1 ∑ , so  m = m d R = ; correct expectations 




5. Comparative statics 
 
 
In order to choose the institutional system, we assume that income within each region is 
Pareto-distributed.23 In this case, there is a stable relationship between average per capita 
income  ( j y )  and  median  income:  j j j Z y m = ,  where  j Z   is  approximately  equal  to  the 
complement of the Gini index ( j j Gini Z − ≈1 ). Thus,  j Z  represents a measure of income 
“equality” within region j: lower values of  j Z  indicates high degree of inequality within region 
                                                 
22  We  assume  that  the  average  regional  endowments  and  the  benefit  function  are  such  that  this 
relationship is always fulfilled. 
23 The Pareto distribution was originally developed to describe the distribution of income, where the 
share p of a population has the (1-p) share of the income (Pareto 1896-97). After Pareto, several efforts 
to confirm or reject this law were done by scholars. In particular, for low-income individuals, the Pareto 
distribution does not seem to fit well real data, and other distributions, such as log-normal (Aitchison 
and  Brown  1957),  are  used.  On  the  contrary,  some  authors  have  tried  to  generalise  the  Pareto 
distribution (Singh and Maddala 1976; Clementi and Gallegati 2005) in order to describe the lower part 
of the income distribution. Moreover, it can be demonstrated that income is asymptotically distributed 
as  a  generalised  Pareto  (Champernowne  1953).  More  recently,  power  laws  or  Levy’s  distributions 
(generalised Pareto distributions) seem to fit quite correctly the data on wealth distribution because of 
the stochastic multiplicative nature of the accumulation process (Reed 2001; Levy 2004). In our model, 
we assume the Pareto distribution as it allows to represent an asymmetric distribution like that of 
income and to interpret the shape parameter of the distribution as a function of the Gini index. In 
addition, our results do not change using another asymmetric distribution such as, for example, the 
lognormal one.  
   14 
j; higher values of  j Z  mean the opposite. Moreover, let us assume that  j n ,  j Z  and  j y are 
mutually independent, thus:   

































Note that each region compares decentralised solution with a centralised one, which is 
calculated with respect to a “benchmark” region (R ). For simplicity, we can then rewrite 











= * .  Thus,  if  we  have  myopic  expectations,  the 
benchmark  corresponds  to  this  condition,  Z y m m d R = = = ;  if  we  have  rational 
expectations,  the  benchmark  is  represented  by  the  richest  region  ( 1 = R ), 
* 1 1 1 1 Z y Z y m d = = = . After some algebra, we can sum up previous results as follows: 
 
 
Table 1 - Solutions  
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j β + − =  
 
 
The generic individual with income 
i
j y  living in region j will prefer decentralisation if: 
 
 






j β                               (23) 
 
 
It is easy to note that the voting result depends on the cost of services that characterises each 
system (taxation) and the supply of public goods and services. Moreover, the richer is the 
individual, the higher is the weight assigned to the tax rate and the lower is that of public 
spending. In this vein, we consider the two components separately. 
 
5.1. The role of taxation 
  
Comparing  tax  rates  under  decentralisation  and  centralisation  means  to  solve  * * t t j < , 
referring, respectively, to equations (20) and (22) of table 1. It yields: 
 
 



















γ                                                    (24)   15 
 
 
Equation (24) implies that individuals are likely to prefer a decentralised institutional setting - 
as they will pay less - whether: income distribution within region j is less unequal that one in 
the benchmark region R ( * R j Z Z > ); the level of per capita income of region j is higher than 
average per capita income ( y y j > ). In other words, citizens belonging to more homogenous 
jurisdictions and richer than the average would stay better under decentralisation as they will 
be subject to a lower taxation.  
The latter condition is driven by the “tax base effect” according to which the wealthier 
community will be able, other things equal, to meet its revenue requirements with lower tax 
rates. As a result, for a specified amount of public services, an individual in a wealthier region 
will have a smaller tax bill than his/her equal in a poorer locality. This is also consistent with 
findings  of  Bolton  and  Roland  (1997)  whereby  there  is,  in  their  case,  a  tax  benefit  from 
separation for richer regions as they no longer provide a tax transfer to poorer ones; on the 
contrary, there is an additional cost of separation for poorer regions due to the smaller tax 
base following separation. 
As  for  within  income  inequality,  higher  local  income  inequality  makes  decentralised 
solution less suitable considering the tax side. The intuition is the following. Individuals living 
in regions characterised by a more equal income distribution find more convenient remain 
autonomous  and  delegate  policy-making  to  their  own  representatives,  who  decide  taxes 
independently, instead of selecting a more cooperative institutional setting where different 
regional income distributions - probably more unequal than their own - will be considered and 
differently affect - i.e. increasing - the taxation level. This result also appears to be in line with 
the “political factor” developed by Bolton and Roland (1997). Indeed, the presence of such 
political factor - which arises, in their model, from differences in income distribution across 
regions, so reflecting the difference in preferences over fiscal policy between the median-voter 
in a specific region and the median-voter in the unified nation - “explains why a region with 
very low income inequality may want to break away from a nation with high income inequality 
and high tax rates in order to impose lower tax rates” (p. 1059). 
On the contrary, in more unequal local communities citizens may get a greater advantage 
by joining with other districts in order to smooth their income distribution, share taxation 
and, thus meet lower tax burden. 
In addition, this finding is more likely when γ  increases, that is the extent of spillovers 
grows  up.  In  general,  decentralisation is  more  likely  to  occur  when  γ   grows  up  since  t 
increases more quickly than  j t  with γ .24  
 
5.2. The role of public spending 
 
Concerning the supply of public goods, we compare the following  * * G G j > , respectively 
from equations (19) and (21). By taking the logarithmic form and solving it, we have: 
 
 



























                                 (25)                    
 
 
                                                 
24 This is due to the fact that, under centralisation, internalisation of positive externalities may occur, 
especially when spillovers are high. Hence, the amount of public goods provided in this case is likely to 
be higher and also the production cost linked thereto. As a consequence, centralised taxation required to 
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* ln   are  two  indexes  of 
heterogeneity, respectively of the population size (Hn) and of income distribution (Hz ).25 
Generally speaking,  Hn and  Hz  represent two structural factors of the economy, which are 
independent of the relative position of region j.  
Hence, expression (25) suggests under which conditions the generic individual would vote 
for decentralisation considering the level of public spending provided. In detail, this happens 
whether he/she belongs to region j which is: larger than the average ( n n j > ); more unequal 
than the benchmark one ( * R j Z Z < ). 
In general, the size effect ( n nj > ) seems to better support a decentralised system in line 
with the fact that “larger groups will provide smaller amounts of a public good” is not a 
universal  result  neither  theoretically  (see,  for  instance,  Chamberlin  1974),  nor  empirically 
(Isaac  and  Walker  1988).  More  recently,  Fiorillo  and  Sacchi  (2011)  also  find  that  larger 
jurisdictions would prefer decentralisation, as these regions should pay implicit transfers (i.e., 
cross subsidisation) to smaller ones when taxation is centralised. Thus, large municipalities 
can self-finance under decentralisation, especially without any external spillovers to exploit.  
Nevertheless, equation (25) starts to be false when variability in size (Hn) increases. In 
other words, centralisation is preferred when regions are very different in size. Intuitively, 
high  variability  in  size  is  correlated  with  high  variability  in  revenues,  thus  public  goods 
provision would be very uneven under decentralisation. As the marginal utility of public goods 
is decreasing, a centralised (uniform) provision allows, on average, a higher level of services 
than a decentralised and uneven one can do. 
In reference to income distribution, we find an opposite result than the previous one, when 
the  tax  side  has  been  considered.  Indeed,  citizens  living  in  less  homogenous  jurisdictions 
( * R j Z Z < ) would prefer decentralisation as they can obtain more public goods and services 
than those provided under a centralised setting, ceteris paribus. This result appears, to some 
extent, not quite standard as it indicates that increasing (income) inequality within region 
contributes  to  increase  welfare  gains  from  decentralised  public  goods  provision.  Further 
developments of the Oates’s Decentralisation Theorem (1972),26 where preferences heterogeneity 
is also within a local community - and not only between local communities - show that the 
centralised solution causes lower welfare losses on efficiency grounds. 
In  our  case,  higher  income  inequality  at  the  local  level  is  likely  to  foster  a  sort  of 
“expenditure decentralisation” which means that a higher amount of public spending can be 
available under a decentralised policy-making process. Thus, we may affirm that, focusing on 
the expenditure side, inequality within region is likely to favour decentralisation. The intuition 
of this finding can be the following. In more unequal regions, the median-voter probably has a 
lower income than the median-voter of the benchmark region, i.e. under centralisation. Being 
poorer,  he/she  needs  a  higher  amount  of  public  goods  which  can  be  obtained  only  under 
decentralisation. Indeed, under centralisation a uniform supply of public services occurs and it 
derives from cooperation among local decision-makers, who take into account, to some extent, 
different  regional  income distributions.  On the  contrary,  the  median-voter  of  less  unequal 
regions is likely to be richer than the “benchmark” median-voter and would need a lower 
amount of public goods, so preferring centralisation.  
Hence, recalling the main findings of Bolton and Roland (1997, p. 1059), “a region with 
high income inequality may want to separate in order to impose more redistribution than in 
the unified nation”; it may want to remain autonomous, in our case, in order to obtain more 
                                                 
25 Since the following holds:  J J
k













26 Some school examples are included in Liberati (1999); Brosio and Piperno (2009).   17 
redistributive  spending.  Furthermore,  by  interpreting  public  spending  as  a  measure  of 
government size, we may draw similar conclusions to those of Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
whereby more inequality leads to a larger public sector.27   
Considering  structural  parameters,  condition  (25)  is  more  likely  to  be  true  when 
variability in income distribution across regions increases (Hz ). This means that inequality 
between regions can also enhance decentralisation; on the contrary, in a centralised system, 
between inequality increases cross subsidisation effect, thus gains are less, on average, than 
losses, because of the decreasing marginal utility of public goods. Again, Bolton and Roland 
(1997) found a similar result whereby the overall effect of an increase in the cross-regional 
differences in income inequality is to make separation more likely. In addition, our finding is to 
some extent consistent with Oates’s Decentralisation Theorem (1972) according to which some 
kind of heterogeneity - in preferences in that case; in income in our model - can enhance 
decentralisation  as  the  more  efficient  solution.  Hence,  both  between  and  within  income 
inequalities are likely to increase the convenience of decentralisation based on expenditure 
reasons. 
Finally, in order to consider the effect of externalities let us take the expected value of 
equation (25) that yields:  
 
 









γ 1 ln                                             (25.a)                    
 
 
According to this “new” condition, decentralisation is likely to prevail when γ  is low. Hence, 
the centralised provision of public goods is, in aggregate, higher than the decentralised one 
when  externalities  are  high.  This  result  is  quite  standard  as  centralisation  is  better  to 
guarantee gains from the internalisation process. However, by comparing equation (25) with 
(25.a), it is worth to note that this finding does not hold for all regions. In particular, small 
regions ( n nj < ) and those where within income inequality is low ( * R j Z Z > ) could supply a 
higher  amount  of  public  services  under  a  decentralised  system  with  high  (and  not  low) 
externalities.   
 
5.3. The individual voting for the institutional system 
 
In order to draw some conclusion on which system is more convenient from the individual 
utility viewpoint, we have to solve equation (23) after making some substitutions. It yields:  
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27 In detail, they studied how income disparity within a one-jurisdiction polity affects government size. 
Yet, this result is not confirmed by Giuranno (2009), who extends Meltzer and Richard’s analysis to a 
two-jurisdiction polity with a common public good and tax policy stipulated on the basis of bargaining 
among the jurisdictional decision-makers. Indeed, by introducing regional representatives’ negotiations 
in the legislature, he shows that greater interregional income disparity leads to a smaller public sector, 
reducing redistributive public spending.   18 
 
 




j U U , the individual with income 
i
j y  votes for decentralisation. The result 
will depend on the impact of relevant variables on taxation and public goods as observed 
before. This means that it is more likely to vote for decentralisation if: a) per capita income of 
region j is higher than the average; b) the size of region j is higher than the average; c) between 
variability of income distribution across regions is high; d) variability in size is low. These 
effects are unambiguous since they specifically affect either tax or public spending side or both 
items in the same direction.  
On the other hand, the impact of within income inequality is not so clear.28 Indeed, from 
previous comparative statics, it emerges that the level of income concentration in region j 
compared to the benchmark one has an opposite effect on taxation and public spending, so 
differently affecting the individual voting for the institutional system. A lower concentration 
reduces the cost (taxation) of decentralising, yet it also implies a lower provision of public 
goods and services under decentralisation. In addition, as already stated, rich people in all 
regions are likely to mainly take into account the cost issue during the voting process; while 
poor people basically consider the different impact of public goods provision on their utility 
functions.  
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In detail, when  j
i





j U U −  always increases with the level of income equality ( j Z ). Thus, it may exists 
a threshold  min Z  such that for high degree of local income concentration ( min Z Z j < ), the rich 
individual votes for centralisation; otherwise ( min Z Z j > ) for decentralisation (figure 1, case 
A). Note that if this value does not exist,30 he/she votes for centralisation (figure 1, case B).  
Then, rich people could prefer a standard level of public goods and services only in the 
case of higher within income inequality. This is mainly due to the fact that they pay less under 
a centralised system than under a decentralised one. Intuitively, the rich belonging to a more 
unequal region know that through centralisation they can reduce their costs of redistribution 
because they have to consider an “overall” income distribution that is flatter than their own.  
When considering an individual poorer than the average ( j
i
j y y < ), they may exist up to 
two thresholds (figure 2, case B):  min Z  and  max Z .31 If no thresholds exist (figure 2, case C), the 
centralised solution is chosen. If only one threshold exists (figure 2, case A), that is  min Z  such 
that  for  high  degree  of  within  income  concentration  min Z Z j < ,  poor  individuals  vote  for 
centralisation; otherwise ( min Z Z j > ) for decentralisation. These results are determined by the 




                                                 
28 The impact of externalities is also not clear a priori considering the difference between the utility 
functions under both regimes. Moreover, we have already noted that different findings also emerge for 
small and large regions focusing only on the expenditure side. 
29 This maximum is feasible only if  1
~
< j Z . 
30 The existence of the threshold depends on the interactions among other variables.  
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However, considering the poor, another threshold can emerge ( max Z ). When  max Z Z j > , 
poor people living in jurisdiction j do not choose decentralisation; this is due to the higher 
centralised provision of public goods when regional income concentration is low (figure 2, case 
B). On the other hand, for intermediate values of local income inequality ( max min Z Z Z j < < ), 
poor  individuals  would  prefer  decentralisation.  Finally,  when  min Z Z j < ,  they  select  a 
centralised system because of the tax argument.  
 
Figure 2 - The institutional choice of the poor individual 
 
 
   20 
Hence, comparing to the rich, poor people also vote for a standard level of public services -  
centralisation - when the degree of income disparity within their region is low. To sum up, no 
a unique solution emerges for both the rich and the poor, but it basically depends on the 
degree of income concentration within their region. More precisely, it seems that they disagree 
for lower within inequality as the poor would prefer centralisation while the rich would vote 
for decentralisation. However, when income distribution  within region worsens (e.g., there 
more poor and/or with less income), rich and poor individuals are likely to agree, both voting 
for centralisation. Thus, we may infer that the pressure for differentiated standard levels of 
public services weakens, in favour of more cooperation and uniform provision of such services 




6. Concluding remarks 
 
 
This paper provides a positive analysis by comparing the convenience of a common standard 
level of services set under a centralised institutional system versus different provision of public 
goods - which means the absence of the standard level - when decisions are decentralised. In 
both cases, a political economy approach is adopted (Persson and Tabellini 2000; Besley and 
Coate  2003;  Giuranno  2009)  and  income  heterogeneity  across  individuals  is  assumed.  A 
different source of disparity across regions such as their income - instead of their preferences 
(Oates  1972)  or  their  population  size  (Fiorillo  and  Sacchi  2011)  -  allows  challenging  the 
traditional findings according to which greater heterogeneity should basically enhance more 
decentralisation.  Moreover,  unlike  the  traditional  literature,  the  effect  of  income  disparity 
within regions is also considered into the analysis. 
In order to choose the institutional system, individuals take into account income inequality 
between and within regions as both can (differently) affect the government decision-making 
process, including the opportunity to fix a standard level of services. In turn, preferences 
heterogeneity is not actually required to make a case for decentralisation (see also Seabright 
1996; Tommasi and Weinschelbaum 2007), especially in the case of public goods with some 
“merit content” as also argued by Hatfield and Miquel (2008).  
By  combining  the  theory  of  fiscal  federalism  with  public  goods  aimed  at  fulfilling 
minimum individual rights, we try to capture both effects of intraregional and interregional 
income inequality extending, to some extent, the Giuranno’s work (2009) where only the latter 
effect is treated,32 and the Meltzer and Richard’s model (1981) where only the former issue is 
considered. 
The  main  findings  of  this  paper  suggest  that  higher  local  income  inequality  -  within 
inequality - makes the decentralised solution less suitable considering the tax side. Indeed, in 
more unequal local communities, citizens may get a greater utility by joining with those of 
other regions in order to smooth their income distribution, share taxation and, thus meet 
lower tax obligations. On the other hand, an opposite result emerges from the expenditure 
side. Indeed, higher income inequality within jurisdiction is likely to favour a higher amount of 
public  services  provided  under  a  decentralised  policy-making  process,  enhancing  a  sort  of 
expenditure decentralisation. 
Hence, in order to draw some conclusion on which system is more convenient from the 
individual utility viewpoint, we have analysed these effects together for different individuals 
(i.e., rich and poor people) living within the same region. Individually, the rich and the poor 
would not always prefer the common standard level of services. In detail, the rich would prefer 
a standard level of public goods (i.e. centralisation) only in the case of higher within income 
disparity, driven by tax motivations. On the contrary, poor people vote for a standard level of 
                                                 
32 As argued by Giuranno (2009, p. 714): “There are, however, a number of ways in which intra- and 
interregional income differences may vary and affect public spending. We leave this analysis for further 
research.”   21 
public services also when the degree of income disparity within their region is low, stimulated 
by a higher spending provision under centralisation. As expected, rich and poor individuals 
seem to prefer opposite regimes but only when income distribution is quite homogenous in 
their  region,  whereas  both  are  likely  to  vote  for  a  common  standard  provision  of  public 
services when within income inequality increases. To some extent, we may affirm that a more 
cooperative solution seems to prevail when “domestic” economic conditions worsen a lot. 
The effect of interregional income inequality is, instead, much clearer as both individuals 
would  prefer  decentralisation  when  inequality  between  regions  is  high.  This  result  sounds 
familiar with the traditional argument of the fiscal federalism (i.e. Oates 1972), even assuming 
homogeneity of preferences. In addition, this finding seems to fit well with the existence of 
institutional conflicts observed at the empirical level in presence of different local resources 
(e.g. in Italy and Belgium), according to which rich regions would prefer to redistribute less, 
while poor ones would get more through implicit transfers mechanisms (see also Bolton and 
Roland 1997; Sacchi 2008). 
Finally, the model can be extended to allow representatives form a minimum winning 
coalition to choose policy in the legislature - non-cooperative legislature as in Besley and 
Coate  (2003)  -  instead  of  assuming  only  the  cooperative  one.  Moreover,  an  empirical 
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